A Forward to the Vanderbilt Law Review\u27s New Section on Legislation by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Published Scholarship The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
1963
A Forward to the Vanderbilt Law Review's New
Section on Legislation
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_scholarship_pub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Published Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation












The Vanderbilt Law Review takes pleasure in presenting to its readers its
new Legislation Section. This section will carry student comments dealing with
problem areas of the law that call for statutory solution, and with recent statutes
of importance; the principal emphasis will be on the first of these-the area of
law reform. The Legislation Section was conceived in response to a challenge
issued by Judge Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court in an article
entitled "To the Right Honorable Law Reviews." Judge Traynor has graciously
consented to write a foreword to this new enterprise; we only hope that we can
live up to his expectations.
A Foreword to the Vanderbilt Law Review's
New Section on Legislation
Hon. Roger J. Traynor*
For all of this century, and some years before it, law reviewers have
trained their one-two-three-year learning primarily on appellate deci-
sions. They have brought youth and zest and some impressive scholar-
ship to the task. More than once they have brightly demonstrated that
their elders whose word is law are not very good at words or, worse,
are very good at words but not so very good at the law or, worse still,
are bumbling on both counts or-aha, no praise be, and close in for the
kill-are men dedicated to iddes fixes that have no place in modem
cosmologies.
The reviews have found a ready audience among students and
scholars, wherever they may be. They early appeared on the open
shelves of many courthouse libraries; but there they at first remained
all too quietly at rest among the circulating reports. Only in recent
years have they gained the status of widespread citation in decisions.
What dislodged the academic-bound commentaries from their dusty
niches was a dual phenomenon. Legal problems were growing novel
horns at an unprecedented rate; fortuitously the new men coming to
the workbenches of the law were prompted by their contemporary
education and experience to reach for all the scholarly aids to con-
tinuing education within their grasp. The concept of the judicial
temperament grew to include an aptitude for learning even from the
young, and a corresponding perspective on emerging as well as on
historical problems. It could no longer be meanly defined as no more
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than a capacity for appraisal of adversary briefs not always suffcient
unto the morrow or even unto the day.
In restrospect it could not have been otherwise. In a world that
barely survived the devastation of global depressions and wars to
move into a swiftly expanding economy and an age of exploration, in
a country that is everywhere shifting from primarily rural to primarily
urban living, the law reviews have become an indispensable signal
corps in the legal process of giving social order to social change. To
courts daily overwhelmed by every conceivable controversy, and
not a few inconceivable ones, they have brought the unhurried re-
flections that sometimes yield fresh insight into the familiar and now
and again anticipate the surprise twist. A responsible judge, arriving
at his decisions as independently as ever, cannot now afford to ignore
the reflections of independent specialists. Rare now is the judge so
narrowly committed to formula or so torpid with revery of simpler
days as to deplore or ignore what a job the law reviews are doing on
appellate decisions, including his own. The reviews have established
lines of education, if not of open communication, between those who
must constantly have a decision ready at least in the nick of time on
a barking controversy and those who have all the time in the world
to reflect on what the bark portends in the way of bite.
So we come to the happy ending of this important first chapter on
law reviews and the law. Is that all there is to the story?
One might think so from a cursory glance at many law reviews,
heavily freighted with critiques of appellate decisions. Yet clearly
more chapters are under way in the story of law reviews and the
law, and for good reason. There is much more to law than appellate
decisions. To recognize the obvious, there is massive statutory law,
controlling with finality the lives of most of us who have no occasion
to litigate its meaning or application all the way to the authority of an
appellate decision. There is administrative law, running the gamut
from rulings not far removed from judicial decision to regulations far
removed from the formality and finality of decisional law. Private
organizations such as corporations and unions, private associations re-
lated to their members by noneconomic ties, impose regulations on
their constituents not unlike those of a state. Inevitably, in an expan-
sive age, law has expanded in all directions and in new forms. Indeed,
a few law schools are already encouraging polymerization of legal
education with related disciplines; it is no longer heresy to suggest
that the analysis of a legal problem may involve some awareness of
its economic or medical or anthropological aspects. There is a break-
down of provincialism in space as well as in subject: mobile domestic
relations and corporations fly straight into conflicts; on a long ffight,
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they risk public encounter with le droit international priv.
What all this portends for the law reviews, as the signal corps of
the law, is a responsibility greater than any they have yet undertaken.
Already some of them, though not nearly enough, are beginning to
acquaint themselves and their readers with the legal problems emerg-
ing beyond the narrow range of appellate decisions. Already some
of them have taken substantial first steps toward their new responsi-
bility, proceeding from comments on statutory interpretation in ap-
pellate decisions to explications of significant new statutes to analysis
of one so-called Model Code or another or even of those bills that
by any other name would smell as model.
For all the sporadic heartening signs, however, they do not add up
to a collective continuing responsibility of the law reviews for the
orderly growth of statutory law comparable to the one they have long
assumed for the orderly growth of decisional law. As bills swarm like
minnows in the aquariums of legislative committees, some quickly,
sometimes all too quickly, liquidated in committee hoppers, and some
tenderly nourished for showcase presentation under the most favorable
circumstances, the need grows for a steady vigil by law reviews in
every state on the legislative process, as alert as the one they now keep
on the judicial process. For lack of such a vigil, many a minnow of
inconsequential appearance in the bill stage has achieved immortality
of sorts as a whale of an act, a frozen monster of language, each inept
or poisonous word of which is Law. For lack of such a vigil, the
legislative process itself suffers. By nature a disorderly process, be-
cause of what is sometimes euphemistically called its responsiveness
to the public, it can also become an irresponsible one in the absence
of informed and forthright criticism.
Last year, in another law review, I stated the problem with some
urgency:
If ever we needed the law reviews, it is in this area. It is an area that most
of them have sadly neglected. They could if they would take the lead on
many timely problems with well-drafted proposals for legislative considera-
tion. They could do a job, and what a job it would be, of analyzing statutes
and administrative rulings as painstakingly as they now analyze opinions. It
would be a job such as could absorb the talents of every student in every
law school.1
I did not quite despair that the challenge would strike a response
here or there, but it went beyond my expectations to receive a letter
from Managing Editor Charles E. McCallum of the Vanderbilt Law
Review setting forth the plans of the Review for a Legislation section.




In this foreword that he requested, I could do justice to the relevant
paragraph in his letter only by quoting it in full:
Our aim is somewhat different from that of other law reviews with
similar departments. While we do not preclude the possibility of studying
in detail recent statutory enactments, we plan to concern ourselves primarily
with the field of law reform. That is, we will locate and discuss areas of the
law that call for statutory reform and will make proposals. Our format for
short student material in this department is: statement and analysis of the
problem; summary and critique of proposed solutions (model acts, uniform
laws, meritorious state acts, laws of other countries); recommendations. We
plan to include, where suitable, well-drafted statutory proposals.
Bravo, editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review, and Godspeed on a
venture that will be always challenging even if at times discouraging.
That paragraph-perhaps some day you will reread it and find its
clarity of purpose as heartening as I do now.
Administrative Procedur e-Supervision of
Administrative Rule-Making
The burden of testing the validity of a rule' promulgated by a gov-
ernmental agency is often borne in litigation by those whose conduct
the rule was designed to regulate. Scrutiny of the rule prior to its
becoming effective by an element of the government independent of
the rule-making agency2 may be the most effective means of shifting
to the government some of that burden.3 Concomitant with this gov-
1. "'[R]ile' means each agency statement of general applicability that implements,
interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or prac-
tice requirements of any agency. The term includes the amendment or repeal of a
prior nule, but does not include ( A) statements concerning only the internal manage-
ment of an agency and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the
public, or ( B) declaratory rulings, . . . or ( C) intra-agency memoranda." REVISEDz
MfODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 1(7).
2. The scope of this article does not include advisory opinions by state supreme
courts. In eleven states such opinions may be requested by the executive or the legisla-
ture. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2102 (1953): "The Governor may, when-
ever he requires it for public information, or to enable him to discharge the duties of
his office with fidelity, request the members of the Supreme Court to give him their
opinions in writing touching the proper construction of any provision in the Constitu-
tion of this State . . . or the constitutionality of any law enacted by the Legislature of
this State." For a concise discussion, see Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Present Status
and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1959).
3. "'This form of review places the burden of proof on the state rather than on the
individual, and it tends to lessen the possibility of conflict after the rule has been in
effect." THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTs, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING PRO-
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